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IX. ADVERTISING
A. Television Programming and Advertising Standards
Commercialization of television may increase following the recent
decision in United States v. National Association of Broadcasters,'
where the U.S. District Court held that the termination of an antitrust
action by a consent decree was proper, thereby effectively eliminating
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) Television Code and
the self-regulating measures contained therein.
The NAB is a television industry trade association, whose mem-
bership includes the major T.V. networks and over 500 individual sta-
tions. Membership in the organization is voluntary and entitles
participants to display the NAB "Seal of Good Practices." The NAB
promulgates, inter alia, a Television Code, which sets forth guidelines
and standards for television programming and advertising; compliance
with this Code is necessary to maintain NAB membership.' The Jus-
tice Department, on its own initiative, sued the NAB,3 alleging that
three advertising standards contained in the NAB Television Code vio-
lated antitrust laws, specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
declares illegal, every contract, combination or conspiracy which re-
strains trade.4 The challenged standards set limitations on the number
of minutes per hour allowed for commercials (time standards), the
number of commercials permitted during one hour (program interrup-
tion standards), and the number of products which could be advertised
during one commercial (multiple product standards).5
Both parties moved for summary judgment; the United States ar-
gued that the purpose of the NAB standards was to artificially manipu-
late the supply of commercial T.V. time, resulting in increased
advertising costs. The NAB argued that the provisions were sensible
voluntary guidelines, which served important social concerns by limit-
ing commercialization of television.6
The court denied NAB's entire motion and denied the United
States' motion as to the time standards and program interruption stan-
!. United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1982).
2. United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D.D.C.
1982).
3. Id
4. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1983).
5. 536 F. Supp. at 152.
6. Id
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dards, stating that a trial was necessary to resolve disputed factual is-
sues under the rule of reason standard.7 The court granted the United
States' motion as to the multiple product standard, which prohibited
the advertisement of more than one product during a commercial
shorter than sixty seconds. The court concluded that this provision was
per se violative of the Sherman Act because it caused some advertisers
to purchase more commercial time than they might economically de-
sire, and was therefore plainly an anti-competitive standard. An in-
junction was issued, prohibiting the NAB from enforcing the multiple
product standard.8
Following the above-mentioned decision, the NAB voluntarily
submitted to a consent decree, thereby avoiding the time and expense
of trial.9 The instant proceeding was held pursuant to the Tunney
Act, 10 which provides that consent decrees, which terminate antitrust
actions, must be in the "public interest.""' The purpose of the Tunney
Act is to prevent injudicious use of consent decrees where the govern-
ment has initiated the antitrust action. 2 To that end, the Act requires
that the Judiciary Department disclose the rationale of the proposed
consent decree,'" that the public be granted an opportunity to comment
on the proposal,' 4 and that the court explicitly determine that the con-
sent decree is in the public interest. 5
When determining whether a consent decree is in the public inter-
est, the court must consider such things as whether a consent decree
will effectively remedy the anti-competitive activity without depriving
private plaintiffs the opportunity to recover against the defendants, due
to the lack of a trial,'6 and that the decree will cause "as little injury as
possible to the general public""' and important private interests.
7. Id at 158. Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies only to agreements which are un-
reasonably restrictive of competition. Whether an agreement is unreasonably restrictive is
decided according to one of two standards, the rule of reason or the per se rule. The rule of
reason analysis is used with "agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint and the reasons why it
was imposed." Id at 154, citing National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
8. 536 F. Supp. at 163, 170.
9. 553 F. Supp. at 621.
10. Id
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (1973).
12. United States, 553 F. Supp. at 622.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1973).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1973).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(e), (f).
16. 553 F. Supp. at 623.
17. Id
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The court addressed the public interest concern by considering two
issues; whether the consent decree would deprive future private plain-
tiffs of prima facie evidence against NAB and whether Action for Chil-
dren's Television (ACT) argument was meritorious.'
8
The court found that although the consent decree may deprive fu-
ture potential plaintiffs the opportunity to use the judgment as prima
facie evidence, the consent decree did not contravene the public inter-
est. The court stated that the legislative policy of encouraging defend-
ants to promptly settle actions and thereby save the government the
time and expense of litigation outweighed the speculative interests of
subsequent plaintiffs. ' 9
Secondly, the court considered ACT's recommendation that the
proposed judgment be revised to allow continued NAB regulation of
commercials during children's television programming because chil-
dren are impressionable and should be shielded from excessive adver-
tising.2" The court concluded that although ACT's concerns were
valid, the consent decree was an effective means of ameliorating the
anticompetitive practice. Since the consent decree would provide full
antitrust relief, it could not be rejected due to the societal concerns.
The court pointed out that individual stations and the FCC were still
free to curtail and regulate children's advertising and that ACT may
encourage them to do so.2'
The court therefore held that the consent decree was not contrary
to the public interest and entered the final judgment accordingly.22
This decision, although consistent with antitrust principles, by
eliminating self-regulation by a trade association, seems contrary to
public policy in general. The court found the consent decree to be in
the public interest according to antitrust law, but did not fully consider
the possible adverse societal effects resulting from the deregulation of
television advertising.
Television ads currently occupy 14 minutes of every hour during
prime time programming, (KGO, ABC affiliate, San Francisco). If an
average of seven two minute ads occur each hour, the program is
thereby interrupted every 6 minutes.23 As one commentator has sug-
gested, the approval of the consent decree in this case may cause T.V.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id at 624.
21. Id. at 624-25.
22. Id. at 625.
23. 47 Fed. Reg. 49024 (Oct. 29, 1982).
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viewing to "become a moving billboard of advertising, interspersed
every 31 minutes with the story line."24
While the court was justified in remedying the anti-competitive
practices of NAB according to antitrust law, "it is clear from the cases
that other factors are not irrelevant."25 The court should "attempt to
harmonize competitive values with other legitimate public interest fac-
tors,"26 and "would be justified in rejecting the proposed decree or re-
quiring its modification if it concluded that the decree unnecessarily
conflicts with important public policies."27
The court here, seemed solely concerned with remedying the anti-
trust violation, and did not give full consideration to the possible far-
reaching effects of the decision. Although individual stations and the
FCC can set their own standards, it is likely that, in an effort to pay for
the rising cost of broadcasting, television viewers will be further bom-
barded by commercials.
Following this decision and "due to the uncertainty cast over
broadcast self-regulation," the NAB dissolved their Radio and Televi-
sion Code, which besides regulating commercial time, also addressed
such things as advertisements for liquor and contraceptive products.
Therefore, the industry-wide standards were abolished and the broad-
casters left to set their own internal standards.28
Susan Fox
B. Consumer Reaction Testing and Comparative Advertising
In 1946, an estimated $3.34 billion was spent on advertising in the
United States.' In 1979 the figure rose to $49.69 billion.2 According to
the latest survey, the total amount of expenditures for 1982 exceeded
$66 billion,3 with over $9.5 billion spent on television advertising
24. Id.
25. United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 150
(1982).
26. Id at 153.
27. Id. at 151.
28. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 22, 1983.
1. Advertising Age, April 30, 1980, at 260.
2. Id
3. Advertising Age, May 30, 1983, at 42 col. 4. This figure takes into account network
advertising ($16.2 billion), spot advertising ($4.3 billion), and local advertising ($3.8 billion).
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alone.4
Given the tremendous growth in the advertising industry in recent
years, it is not surprising that litigation involving false advertising has
also increased dramatically. As new products are introduced into the
market, manufacturers attempt to gain a competitive advantage for
their product through the use of creative advertising. Since these at-
tempts often result in the use of deceptive tactics, the necessity for es-
tablishing guidelines to indicate the boundaries which separate what is
fair practice and what is unfair practice becomes paramount.
Regulation of advertising practices was slow to develop. Initially,
courts were reluctant to permit a cause of action for false advertising.5
Litigation was generally limited to tort actions alleging "passing off."6
Realizing the inadequacies of the common law tort in protecting busi-
nesses from the effects of false advertising, legislators enacted Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.7 The statute had limited utility
in that it was only enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission and
not by private parties.8 To remedy this problem Congress passed the
Trademark Act of 1920, a statute that was only marginally effective as
it required proof that the false representations were made with the in-
tent to deceive.9
In 1938, Representative Fritz Lanham, a lawyer from Texas, intro-
duced a bill in Congress which concerned possible revisions to the Fed-
eral Trademark Act of 1920. The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946,
expanded the remedies available for false advertising claims by com-
petitors, particularly in Section 43(a) which states:
Any person who shall, affix, apply, or annex, or use in con-
nection with any goods or services . . . any false description
or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable
to a civil action by any person. . . who believes that he is or
4. Advertising Age, April 18, 1983, at 31, col. I. Figures for the previous year (1981)
were $8.4 billion.
5. Note, Implied Misrepresentations in Advertisements under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act. American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 97,
102 (1982).
6. "Passing off" was defined by the Ninth Circuit as "the selling of a good or service of
one's own creation under the name or mark of another." Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602,
604 (1981).
7. 47 Alb. L. Rev. 97, 105 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 106.
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is likely to be damaged by the use of such false description or
representation.
A private right of action was thus articulated. A method was pro-
vided "by which commercial interests could protect their property
rights when they were threatened by false and misleading statements
by competitors without reliance on government law enforcement or
regulatory action."' 0 Yet Section 43(a) did not attain its full potential
as a cause of action for false advertising until the middle 1970's. It was
at this time that the court first held that a literally correct statement
may still be actionable under Section 43(a) if the advertisement misled
or deceived the public." InAmerican Home Products Corp. v. Johnson
& Johnson,'2 the court held that implied misrepresentations are also
covered by Section 43(a). The court noted that "clever use of innu-
endo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous suggestions could shield the
advertisement from scrutiny precisely when protection against such so-
phisticated deception is most needed."' 3 The court also stated that "the
truth or falsity of the advertisement usually should be tested by the
reactions of the public."' 4 The Code of Advertising of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus states: "[a]n advertisement as a whole may be
misleading although every sentence separately considered is literally
true.""5 Therefore, if the statements made in the advertisement are not
literally false but the plaintiff maintains that the ad is an implied mis-
representation, the court will require that a consumer reaction test be
administered to ascertain whether the public is in fact misled by the ad.
Consumer reaction tests are generally regarded as more accurate
method of determining if consumers are deceived than the alternative
procedure of having trial court judges review the evidence and make
that determination. However, the tests remain subject to the courts'
scrutiny as to their credibility. The issue of the utilization of a con-
sumer test and its credibility was recently examined in Coca Cola Co. v.
Tropicana Products, Inc. ,6 where the District Court of New York orig-
inally held that a preliminary injunction to prevent a television com-
mercial from being aired will not be issued unless the results of a
10. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act as a Private Remedy for False Adver-
tising. 37 Food, Drug, Cosm. L.J. 264, 271 (1982).
11. American Brands Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (1976).
12. 577 F.2d 160 (1978).
13. Id. at 165.
14. Id.
15. Note, Comparative Advertising, Commercial Disparagement and False Advertising,
71 Trade-Mark Rep. 620, 633 (1981).
16. 538 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).
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credible consumer reaction survey reveal that viewers are likely to be
misled, decieved or confused by the advertisement. On appeal, how-
ever, the circuit court held that notwithstanding the questionable credi-
bility of the consumer reaction test, a sufficient showing was made to
support a preliminary injunction.' 7
In Coca-Cola, an action was brought against Tropicana alleging
false and misleading advertising in violation of the Lanham Act. The
advertisement in question was a television commercial for Tropicana's
"Premium Pack" processed orange juice. Coca-Cola claimed that it
suffered irreparable injury in the nature of lost sales of its product,
"Minute Maid" processed orange juice, because of Tropicana's mis-
leading contentions. The commercial featured Olympic gold-medalist
Bruce Jenner squeezing a fresh orange into a "Premium Pack"
container while the commercial's announcer stated that the product
was "pure pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange." Coca Cola
asserted that this sequence as visually depicted would deceive consum-
ers into believing that Tropicana is fresh-squeezed orange juice. Coca
Cola commissioned ASI Market Research to conduct a consumer reac-
tion test and submitted the results along with expert testimony to sup-
port its claims of false advertising under the Lanham Act. This
consumer reaction test was administered in three shopping malls, using
500 women appearing to be between the ages of 18 and 65, who had
purchased orange juice within the last 3 months and had regularly used
bottled or cartoned orange juice. After being shown the Jenner com-
mercial the women were asked the following questions: "What ideas
was this commercial trying to get across to you about Tropicana Or-
ange Juice?;" "What did they show in the commercial about Tropicana
Orange Juice?;" and "What did this portion of the commercial suggest
to you?" (referring to the sequence in which the orange was squeezed
into the Tropicana carton). Using the responses ASI compiled, Coca
Cola's advertising expert conducted his own analysis and concluded
that 43% of those interviewed thought that "Premium Pack" contained
fresh-squeezed orange juice. This figure was arrived at after the re-
sponses of all 3 of ASI's questions were combined together and answers
mentioning "freshness" were isolated.
At the trial level, Tropicana brought its own expert who testified
that ASI's consumer reaction survey was ambiguous as to what
message the viewers actually believed the commercial conveyed.
Tropicana's expert claimed that the test was ambiguous in terms of its
17. 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982).
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methodology, execution, interpretation and design and should there-
fore be discredited as an indicator of the level of consumer deception
generated by the Jenner commercial.
The lower court recognized the ambiguity of the advertisement in
the sequence which showed Jenner squeezing an orange into a Tropi-
cana carton, which was suggestive of fresh-squeezed orange juice, while
an oral disclaimer negates this suggestion by stating that the product
was processed orange juice. However, the lower court stated that al-
though a more thorough survey might well have substantiated Coca
Cola's claims, the ASI survey was not probative of consumers' percep-
tions concerning the advertisement. The court proceeded to conduct its
own analysis of the consumer reaction test findings and concluded that
no more than half of the 15% of responses were actually misled to be-
lieve that Tropicana was fresh-squeezed orange juice.' 8
There is no minimum number of deceived viewers required before
a court will issue a preliminary injunction. 9 However, the lower court,
in denying a preliminary injunction, found that the degree of confusion
was insubstantial when balanced against the fact that Trpicana would
be forced to spend a large sum of money and time in revamping the
Jenner commercial or creating a new commercial. In addition, Tropi-
cana would lose sales for its product in the period it was left without a
commercial, while competitors (including Coca Cola) would continue
promoting their products.
There are two relevant requirements that must be met for a court
to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) the likelihood of suffering irrepa-
rable harm if relief is not granted, and 2) a likelihood of success on the
20merits. On appeal, the circuit court held that these two requirements
were met by Coca Cola. The lower court erred in analyzing the test
results in the context of weighing the merits of Coca Cola's case in
chief. Instead, the test results should have been used by the court to
determine the likelihood of irreparable injury to Coca Cola.
The circuit court stated all that is required for a finding of irrepa-
rable injury is a showing that a "not insubstantial number of consum-
18. It seems ironic that where the major issue involved in a case is the accuracy of the
methodology and interpretation of a particular consumer reaction survey, the court would,
on its own initiative, further confound the survey's credibility by omitting several of its re-
sponses and subsequently attempt to deduce some rational conclusions from the remaining
responses. Perhaps the court then realized the absurdity of its action and thus proceeded to
reject the survey's results in toto.
19. Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc. 538 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (1982).
20. 690 F.2d 312, 314-15 (1982).
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ers were clearly mislead by [Tropicana's] ad."'" In light of Coca Cola's
("Minute Maid") erratic but generally declining sales statistics both
prior to and subsequent to the Jenner commercial, the appellate court
held that Coca Cola had met its burden. The appellate court further
held that Coca Cola had demonstrated it was likely to succeed on the
merits of its claim of false advertising. The court found that the Jenner
commercial was false on its face.22 In fact, Tropicana orange juice is
not squeezed directly into the carton as visually depicted, but is heated
and sometimes frozen before it is packaged. In addition, the audio
portion of the commercial which stated that Tropicana orange juice is
"pasteurized juice as it comes from the orange" was blatently false;
pasteurized juice does not come directly from oranges as represented.23
The circuit court held that once the requirements for a preliminary
injunction were met, a balancing of the hardships, as performed by the
lower court, was inappropriate. Having been found to have abused its
discretion, the district court's ruling was reversed and a preliminary
injunction was issued.
Methodological flaws have also been the subject of inquiry in cases
where the claims made in the advertisement themselves are based on
consumer preference tests (i.e., comparative advertising).
Comparative advertisements are those which "specifically identify
competitors or competing products by name, trademark, or picture in-
stead of by general references such as to 'Brand X' or 'a leading
brand' ".24 This practice has not always been accepted by television
networks. Advertisers did not favor the idea of providing free exposure
to the competitor by making specific reference to the other product.
The use of comparative advertisements also increased the likelihood of
being sued by the competitors. In 1971, a major television network
accepted a comparative advertisement for the first time and the tenor of
the advertising industry today is reflective of this practice.25
21. Id at 317.
22. Id at 317-18.
23. Id. at 318.
24. 47 Alb. L. Rev. 97, 126 (1982).
25. Comparative advertising is so common today that all of the major television net-
works have developed their own set of guidelines. For example, the NBC guidelines of
January 16, 1974 require: (1) the identified products must actually compete; (2) competitors
must be fairly and properly identified; (3) advertisers must not discredit, disparage or un-
fairly attack competitors, their products or other industries; (4) identification of the competi-
tor or his product "must be for comparison purposes and not simply to upgrade by
association"; (5) related or similar properties or ingredients should be compared, "dimen-
sion to dimension, feature to feature, or wherever possible by a side-by-side demonstration";
1984]
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A recent case, Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Meyers Co.,26 dealt
with this issue of methodologically flawed consumer preference tests in
a comparative advertisement. The court held that a television commer-
cial advertising a product violated the Lanham Trademark Act if it
depicted consumer preference test results or utilized methodology so as
to deceive a reasonably intelligent consumer about the product's inher-
ent qualities or characteristics." Sassoon involved a television com-
mercial made by Bristol-Meyers to promote its beer-enriched shampoo,
"Body on Tap." The commercial featured high fashion model Chris-
tian Ferrare holding a bottle of Body on Tap and stating "[I]n shampoo
tests with over 900 women like me, Body on Tap got higher ratings
than Prell for body. Higher than Flex for conditioning. Higher than
Sassoon for strong, healthy looking hair." As each of the shampoos
were mentioned, that shampoo was shown on the screen.
The shampoo preference test mentioned in the advertisement was
conducted by an independent market research firm, Marketing Infor-
mation Systems, Inc. ("MISI"). The procedure of this test (called
"blind monadic testing") was to have approximately 200 women in
each of four groups try one shampoo only and rate that shampoo on a
qualitative scale of six ratings ranging from "outstanding" to "poor."
MISI tabulated only the top two rankings ("outstanding" and "excel-
lent") for each of the shampoos and discarded the remaining four rank-
ings from their data. MISI determined that a larger percentage (36%)
of women who tried Body on Tap rated it in the top two rankings than
the percentage of women who tried Sassoon shampoo (24%). These
figures provided the basis for the assertion made in the Ferrare com-
mercial that women preferred Body on Tap to Sassoon.
Vidal Sassoon, manufacturer of one of the competing shampoos
mentioned in the advertisement, brought this suit against Bristol-Mey-
ers claiming that the Ferrare commercial violated the prohibition of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act against false and mislead-
ing advertising. Sassoon claimed that the shampoo preference tests
were portrayed in a misleading way and that the methodology of the
test itself was inherently biased. Sassoon claimed that: 1) only 200
women tested each shampoo, not 900 as the commercial implied;
2) each woman tested only one shampoo, therefore, no product-to-
product comparisons were actually made; 3) only 2/3 of the partici-
(6) the compared property must be "significant" in terms of product "value or usefulness" to
the consumer; and (7) the difference must be "measurable and significant."
26. 661 F.2d 272 (1981).
27. 1d.
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pants in the shampoo test were over 18 years of age; 28 and 4) only the
two top categories of rankings were revealed in the results in the
commercial.
Sassoon asserted that the directions given to the women in the
group testing Sassoon shampoo were contrary to Sassoon's own direc-
tions. In addition, those women testing Sassoon shampoo were permit-
ted to use other brands of shampoo during the testing period. Hence,
according to Sassoon, the responses of the women in this test group
were inaccurate. Sassoon alleged that as a result of these flaws, viewers
would be deceived by the allegedly inaccurate test results and would
purchase Body on Tap rather than Sassoon shampoo. To support this
claim Sassoon commissioned ASI Market Research Inc. to conduct a
consumer reaction survey to determine if in fact consumers were
deceived by the Ferrare commercial. Six hundred thirty-five partici-
pants were asked four questions concerning the statements made in the
advertisement. Results from this survey indicated that 95% of those
interviewed thought that each of the 900 women in the shampoo pref-
erence test mentioned by Ferrare in the advertisement had tried two or
more brands of shampoo. Moreover, 62% of those polled were con-
vinced by the commercial that Body on Tap was a competitively supe-
rior product. 29 Based on the evidence, the district court issued a
preliminary injunction for violation of Section 43(a). On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed.
In the course of ruling that Bristol-Meyers' television commercial
violated the Lanham Act, the court examined cases interpreting the Act
and the legislative history of the Act. In that the statute itself does not
address consumer preference testing,30 the court noted that the mean-
ing of the statute must be read in light of its purpose, and that purpose
was to protect the consumer from the effects of false advertising. As
was stated at the Congressional hearing, another chief purpose moti-
vating the legislators to enact this statute was to update existing legisla-
tion in the area so as to "conform to legitimate present-day business
practice."'" To accomplish these ends, the courts have given the lan-
guage of the Act a broad interpretation.
28. This later proved to be an important consideration by the court in that Body on Tap
had appealed disproportionately to the teenage market prior to the commercial. Bristol-
Meyers succeeded in increasing adult usage of Body on Tap (through the Ferrare commer-
cial)--a market segment which Sassoon had previously fared very well with.
29. Sassoon, 661 F.2d at 276.
30. This is certainly not surprising since when section 43(a) was enacted, comparative
advertising was non-existent.
31. Sassoon, 661 F.2d at 277.
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The court stated that the prohibition of Section 43(a) applies to
misrepresentations made with reference to the "inherent quality or
characteristics" of a product. The court then took note that Bristol-
Meyers did not patently describe the quality of Body on Tap in a false
way. In fact, the misrepresentations allegedly made in the advertise-
ment concerned tests results and methodology, not the "inherent quali-
ty" of the product. However, it was found that the consumer
preference test results and methodology were depicted in a misleading
fashion such that the reasonably intelligent consumer would be
deceived about the product. The result of the advertisement was that
consumers were misled into believing Body on Tap was a competitively
superior shampoo. Since the qualities of the product involved did not
lend themselves to objective measurements,32 the court stated that "the
consumer test truly becomes the message of inherent superiority.
Sassoon satisfied the additional requirement of making an ade-
quate showing of the possibility of irreparable injury.34 The court de-
termined that a reasonable basis for this showing was presented since
both Bristol-Meyers, Body on Tap and Sassoon shampoo competed for
the same market and if the commercial was seen often enough, viewers
might have been less likely to purchase Sassoon shampoo.35
The court in Sassoon determined that the methodology of the con-
sumer preference tests (in addition to the manner in which the test re-
sults were portrayed) was flawed, and subsequently issued a
preliminary injunction. However, in similar circumstances, the courts
have been hesitant in making this evaluation. In American Home
Products Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,3 6 the court held that in order to
determine whether the test methodology provides a sufficient basis for
claims asserted in a comparative advertisement, it is first necessary to
carefully examine test design and execution, and to summons experts to
testify in the areas of statistics, market research and psychology. The
decision to enjoin an advertisement should be made only after careful
consideration of "substantial proof of invalidity . . . [to prevent] . . .
unpredictable judicial decisions that might severely disrupt the stan-
dard practices of the advertising and business communities. ' 37 The
court added that evidence of an alternative test which would be meth-
32. The "qualities" of a shampoo product are, for example, that it offers "stronger, more
manageable hair" or "more body and bounce."
33. Sassoon, 661 F.2d at 278.
34. Id
35. Id. at 278-79.
36. 522 F. Supp. 1035 (1981).
37. Id at 1039.
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odologically superior (while still being practical) may be necessary
before a court will enjoin an advertisement. 38 With this added element,
"the need to remedy harm caused by representations surmised upon
erroneous tests . . . [is balanced] . . .against the need to keep judicial
interference to a minimum. 39
In certain cases, it will be clear that an advertisement should be
enjoined, as it is patently false or ambiguous. In other cases an unam-
biguous true statement made in an advertisement will not be enjoined.
However, in most instances the representations will be somewhere in
the middle. It is in these cases that the utmost care must be exercised to
balance the interests of both parties. If the purpose of the Lanham Act
is to give relief (in the form of an injunction) against statements made
which cause injury, it seems inconsistent to require that the plaintiff
(who has the burden of proof) prove additional elements. For example,
it may place an unwarranted burden on the plaintiff to require that he
devise a more accurate alternative preference test as suggested in Amer-
ican Home Products. On the other hand, alleged violators of the Lan-
ham Act should not be subjected to claims that are proven meritless
only after a costly, time-consuming trial. Astronomical expenses are
incurred in conceiving and developing strategic advertising campaigns,
and those who do so accurately have the right to enjoy advantages in
marketing. If a preliminary injunction is issued, then later retracted,
the fruits of their efforts may be lost. In an age where the needs and
desires of consumers are constantly changing, the temporary withhold-
ing of an advertisement from the media may result in tremendous
losses to the defendant. Competitors could therefore use the prelimi-
nary injunction as a strategic method of alleviating competition, at least
temporarily. Therefore, the decision to enjoin an advertisement should
be made only after a careful weighing of these conflicting interests.
As the Board of Directors of the American Association of Adver-
tising Agencies has purported:
When used truthfully and fairly, comparative advertising pro-
vides the consumer with needed and useful information.
However . . . extreme caution should be exercised because
comparative advertising, by its very nature, can distort facts
38. Id
39. Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause ofAction for False Adver-
tising, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 383, 417 (1983).
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and misrepresent the truth.4 °
Loretta Naughton
40. Trade-Mark Rep. 620, 639 (1981).
